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LEGISLATION NOTES
GOOD SAMARITAN STATUTES-ADRENALIN FOR THE
"GOOD SAMARITAN"
Within the last five years, over half of the states have enacted, in one
form or another, what are commonly referred to as Good Samaritan laws.
The impact of this legislation on the common law of torts and a compara-
tive study of the various state enactments form the subject of this dis-
cussion.
THE GOOD SAMARITAN CONCEPT
The Good Samaritan statutes exempt physicians, and quite frequently
others, from liability for civil damages caused by negligent acts or omis-
sions while rendering care or treatment at the scene of an accident or
emergency. The cloak of immunity, excusing negligence, is thus shrouded
upon doctors and others who come to the aid of their fellows in time of
peril. While the Good Samaritan concept is not entirely foreign to Ameri-
can law, the extinguishment of a cause of action which would otherwise
accrue by reason of negligence represents a distinct change in prior law
and a significant development in the law of torts. American courts, sym-
pathetic with the moral issue involved, have nevertheless consistently re-
fused to recognize a legal duty to assist a stranger in time of distress.'
Where a duty to render aid has been found, it generally rests on the sound
and realistic basis that the defendant's conduct, although perhaps not ac-
tionable, has in some way contributed to the emergent situation.2 Thus, a
1935 Illinois statute makes a "compulsory Good Samaritan" of any vehicu-
lar driver involved in an accident by requiring him to "render to any per-
son injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying,
or the making of arrangements for the carrying of such person to a physi-
cian, surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent
that such treatment is necessary, or if such carrying is requested by the
injured person." Although there is no duty to assist a complete stranger,
one who does volunteer aid to another in need assumes thereby a legal
responsibility to exercise reasonable care and skill for such other's safety.4
The fact that the Good Samaritan is acting gratuitously or as an accom-
modation is immaterial.5 It is the affirmative act of rendering aid which
1 PROSSER, TORTS § 38 (2d ed. 1955).
2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 322 (1934). 3 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951, S 135.
4 PROSSER, TORTS S 38 (2d ed. 1955), "The Good Samaritan may find himself liable
where those who passed by on the other side will not"; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 323, 324
(1934); 38 AM. JuR. 659, Negligence, S 17.
5 Triola v. Frisella, 3 111. App.2d 200, 121 N.E.2d 49 (1954); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 325
(1934).
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subjects him to liability for any bodily harm caused another by his failure
to pursue a reasonable course of conduct. The reasonableness of conduct,
however, is necessarily determined by the surrounding circumstances. 6
Thus, the fact that the Good Samaritan is confronted with a sudden
emergency which requires immediate decisions is a factor in determining
the reasonable character of his choice of action.7 The Good Samaritan
doctrine further requires, before liability will attach, that the negligence
of the volunteer must "worsen the position" of the person in distress. S This
is particularly relevant where the Good Samaritan's conduct takes the
form of rescue," and is considered determinative of the question whether
he may, once having undertaken the rescue, abandon or discontinue his
efforts. 10
The objective sought to be accomplished by modern Good Samaritan
legislation is to encourage the rendering of emergency medical aid to
injured persons without fear of civil liability.1 While the legislative
objective is clear enough, the factors giving rise to such laws are matters
of conjecture. There are no reported cases dealing with a physician's
malpractice in rendering emergency care or treatment outside of his office
or hospital.' 2 Thus, it appears that "threat" of a malpractice suit under
these circumstances rather than actual suit itself, assuming that some trial
cases would have been appealed, is the real impetus behind the sudden
rash of Good Samaritan legislation.
PERSONS IMMUNE FROM CIVIL LIABILITY
Nineteen of the twenty-eight states which have enacted Good Samaritan
legislation restrict the grant of immunity to licensed medical practitioners
and registered nurses. 3 Of this group, five states, Indiana,14 Maryland, 15
Massachusetts,'0 Utah 17 and Virginia,' 8 extend immunity only to physi-
6 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 283 (1934).
7 Id. at S 296. 8 Id. at §§ 323, 324.
9 United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cit. 1962).
10 RESTATEMENT, TORTS S§ 323, 324, 325.
11 Introductory Statement, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:62A-1, 2A:62A-2 (Supp. 1963).
12 51 CALIF. L. REv. 816 (1963); Letter dated August 26, 1963 from Hon. Otto Kerner,
Governor, State of Illinois, addressed to Secretary of State, vetoing House Bill No. 1489
(proposed Illinois Good Samaritan bill, passed by House and Senate).
13 See accompanying chart.
14 IND. STAT. ANN. ch. 63 § 1361 (Supp. 1963).
15 Mo. CODE ANN. art. 43, § 149A (Supp. 1963).
16 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, 5 12B (Supp. 1962).
17 UTAH CODE ANN. 58 §§ 12-23 (Supp. 1961).
18 VA. CODE ANN. tit. 54 § 276.9 (Supp. 1962).
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cians licensed by their state; while four states, California, 19 Nebraska,20
Nevada21 and Wisconsin,22 extend protection to physicians and nurses
who are licensed or registered under their states' Medical or Nursing Acts.
The statutes of ten states23 protect physicians licensed by any state; and
the acts of two of these states, Mississippi24 and South Dakota, 25 also in-
clude nurses registered under the laws of any state. The nine remaining
states 26 provide generally that any person who renders aid or treatment
at the scene of an emergency will come within the purview of their
statute. Thus, close to one-third of the states extend protection only to
medical practitioners and nurses licensed by their state; one-third protect
medical practitioners and nurses licensed by any state; and one-third seek
to protect anyone.
Since the underlying purpose of the Good Samaritan law is to provide
on-the-spot emergency medical care or treatment, it is not surprising that
two-thirds of the state legislatures have restricted their grant of immunity
to those persons trained to administer medical services. Yet it seems unfair
that the law should hold accountable an untrained private person who
responds in an emergency while it releases the very person who ordinarily
would be expected, by reason of his training and experience, to respond
properly in an emergency situation. While the distinction between physi-
cians and unskilled persons is not wholly without merit since the policy of
the law should be to encourage the best possible aid, the distinction be-
tween licensed medical practitioners within the enacting state and those
licensed by another state is at best dubious. Each state has licensing and
other requirements to assure a minimum degree of competence in its medi-
19 CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE § 2144 (Supp. 1959). (Physicians); CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE
§ 2727.5 (Supp. 1963). (Nurses).
20NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1152 (Supp. 1961).
21 NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 41, §§ 1, 2 (Supp. 1963).
22 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 147.17(7) (Supp. 1963) (Doctors); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 147.06(5)
(Supp. 1963) (Nurses).
23 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 08.64.365 (Supp. 1962); CONN. SE5s. LAWS 1963 H.B. No. 2576,
approved June 3, 1963; MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.563 (Supp. 1963); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 8893.5 (Supp. 1962); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 329:55 (Supp. 1963); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:62A-1, 2A:62A-2 (Supp. 1963); N.D. CEN. CODE ANN. §§ 43-17-37, 43-17-38
(Supp. 1961); PA. Acts 1963, No. 301, S.B. No. 511 §§ 1, 2, approved August 8, 1963;
R.I. GEN'L LAWS ch. 37, § 5-37-14 (Supp. 1963); S.D. SEss. LAWS 1961 H.B. No. 509,
approved January 27, 1961.
24 Miss. CODE ANN. § 8893.5 (Supp. 1962).
25 S.D. S~ss. LAWS 1963 H.B. No. 678, approved March 5, 1963.
26 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-624 (Supp. 1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-930 (Supp. 1962);
MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 17-410 (Supp. 1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 12-12-3, 12-12-4
(Supp. 1963); Ouio REv. CODE § 2305.23 (Supp. 1963); OKLA. SESs. LAWS 1963 S.B.
No. 206, approved May 22, 1963; TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-622 (Supp. 1963); TEX. REv.
CIV. STATS. ANN. art. la (Supp. 1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 33-343.1 (Supp. 1961).
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cal practitioners. It is submitted that restricting immunity on the basis of a
single state's licensing statute is an unnecessary refinement in this area.
Moreover, it impedes uniformity and thus serves only to confuse the
ambit of protection in the minds of those persons who are supposedly to
be encouraged to act in emergencies.
SCOPE OF IMMUNITY
All states which have enacted Good Samaritan legislation, except Mis-
sissippi and North Dakota, have granted immunity on the basis of excus-
ing acts or omissions made in good faith. While the statutes of thirteen
states specifically exclude from their coverage acts or omissions amount-
ing to gross or wilful and wanton negligence, the statutes of an equal
number of states do not.27 The complete dearth of appellate decisions con-
struing these statutes, even in states which have had them for some time,
makes it difficult to predict how the courts will treat them. The problem
is further complicated by the introduction of the illusive concept of
"good faith," which pervades each statute and thereby dilutes, to the point
of ambiguity, the basic grant of immunity. The first Good Samaritan law,
for example, was enacted by California in 1959. It provides that "No
(physician or surgeon), who in good faith renders emergency care at the
scene of the emergency, shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of
any acts or omissions.., in rendering the emergency care."' 28 The overly
broad language seemingly confers upon the Good Samaritan a blanket im-
munity for any and all acts. Yet the courts of that state and others con-
struing statutes similarly worded may view the "good faith" requirement
as excluding from the grant of immunity not only acts or omissions
amounting to wilful and wanton negligence but those constituting gross
negligence as well. It is interesting to note that California's Good Samari-
tan law protecting nurses, enacted four years later in 1963, contains the
specific limitation that "This protection shall not grant immunity from
civil damages when the person is grossly negligent. '29 Are we to under-
stand that California physicians who render emergency care are immune
from liability for their grossly negligent acts, while nurses who render
similar care, yet who have inferior training to do so, are held liable for
theirs? Perhaps not, but the statute granting the physician immunity is
not at all helpful in the determination of this question, and the point will
remain doubtful until litigated.
The true anomalies of the Good Samaritan group are the statutes of
Mississippi and North Dakota. Instead of abrogating the common law,
27 See accompanying chart.
28 CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE § 2144 (Supp. 1959).
29 CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE S 2727.5 (Supp. 1963).
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Mississippi's statute merely confirms it by providing that no physician or
nurse-"who, in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care, renders
emergency care to any injured person at the scene of the emergency, or in
transporting said injured person to a point where medical assistance can be
reasonably expected, shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of any
acts or omissions by such persons in rendering the emergency care .... -30
Thus, in Mississippi, the Good Samaritan must continue to conform his
conduct to that of a reasonable man under like circumstances in order to
come within the statute, which is the identical standard of conduct im-
posed by the common law.31 North Dakota's statute provides that "Any
physician ... who in good faith renders ... emergency care at the scene
of the emergency shall be expected to render only such emergency care as
in his judgment is at the time indicated. '3 2 The legislature may have
attempted to fix a standard of conduct, but the courts of that state when
interpreting the statute are not likely to apply a purely subjective stand-
ard of conduct.8 3 It is established law in malpractice that physicians are
required to exercise reasonable and ordinary care or skill, judged by
standards of care or skill ordinarily exercised by other practitioners in the
same locality34 or community.3 5 Since the physician's judgment must be
reasonable, it can be argued that the North Dakota statute does little more
than iterate existing law and the fact of emergency is a circumstance to
be considered together with others in determining the question of negli-
gence.
LIMITATIONS ON IMMUNITY
The fact that care or treatment must be rendered at the "scene of an
emergency" is the most frequently recited limitation contained in Good
Samaritan legislation. Other variations of this include "at the scene of an
accident,"36 "at the scene of an accident or emergency, 37 and "the scene
of a highway or roadside accident. '38 While the term emergency is char-
30 MISS. CODE ANN§ 8893.5 (Supp. 1962).
31 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 283.
32N.D. CEN. CODE ANN. §§ 43-17-37, 43-17-38 (Supp. 1961).
33 See generally Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1927); Silverman and Seidler, A Psychological Evaluation of the Law of Torts, 47
A.B.A.J. 180 (1961).
34 Hanson v. Thelan, 42 N.D. 617, 173 N.W. 457 (1919).
35 Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940); Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749,
205 P.2d 3 (1949); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 298, 299.
36 MD. CODE ANN. art. 43, § 149A (Supp. 1963).
37 GA. CODE ANN. § 84-930 (Supp. 1962).
P8 VA. CODE ANN, tic. 54 § 276.9 (Supp. 1962).
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acteristic of the Good Samaritan law, the statute of only a single state,
New Mexico, sets forth its definition: "an unexpected occurrence involv-
ing injury or illness to persons, including motor vehicle accidents and
collisions, disasters, and other accidents and events of similar nature occur-
ring in public or private places. ' '39 This definition appears to describe
substantially those situations traditionally included within the "emergen-
cy" doctrine.4 0
Under Oklahoma's statute, 41 the emergency care renderable by non-
practitioners is specifically limited to certain enumerated acts: artificial
respiration; preventing or retarding the loss of blood; and aiding or restor-
ing heart action or circulation of blood. No limitations are placed upon the
acts of a licensed practitioner who presumably has a free hand in selecting
the method of treatment and may render care as the circumstances dic-
tate.
Seven states have limited the coverage of their acts to emergency care
rendered "outside the place and course of ordinary employment,"42 which,
in the case of doctors and nurses, would exclude from coverage all situa-
tions where aid or treatment is administered in the physician's office or
a hospital, even though under emergency circumstances. The statutes of
two other states have attached the proviso to their grants of immunity
that "no doctor-patient relationship pre-exist the rendering of emergency
treatment. ' 43 The majority of states require that the emergency care be
rendered "without compensation"; 44 and two states have added to this
"and without expectation of remuneration. '45 This latter provision could
cause the courts difficulty since physicians who render emergency treat-
ment are generally accorded a right in quasi contract to collect for the
reasonable value of services rendered. 46
CONCLUSION
The importance and popularity of Good Samaritan legislation are ap-
parent when it is considered that thirty-two states during 1963 entertained
bills or amendments to existing laws designed to afford civil liability
immunity for those rendering aid or assistance in emergency situations.4 7
39 N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 12-12-3, 12-12-4 (Supp. 1963).
4 0 See PROSSER, TORTS § 32 at 138 (2d ed. 1955).
41 OKLA. SEss. LAWS 1963 S.B. No. 206, approved May 22, 1963.
42 See accompanying chart.
43 Ibid. 44 Ibid.
45N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 12-12-3, 12-12-4 (Supp. 1963); TEx. REv. Civ. STATS. ANN.
art. la (Supp. 1961).
46 See RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 116 (1937).
4 7 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 1963 STATE LEGISLATION ROUNDUP at pp. 1, 2.
